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Nonprofit governance:  The shape of board-organisation communication 
ABSTRACT This qualitative study investigated corporate governance and management practices, with 
a particular focus on communications between the board and senior management, in two disability 
service organisations in the nonprofit sector. Fifteen interviewees participated across the two case 
studies and their insights and contributions were thematically analysed. 
Among the key findings was a significant contrast in communication processes across the two 
organisations. In one, communications were tightly controlled by the CEO (hourglass-shaped 
approach) and, in the second, there was a more accessible communication process between the board 
and senior management. This paper explores these two communication models.  
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Governance of nonprofit organisations is increasingly important. Responsible governance and 
effective management are recognised as priorities because of a reduced reliance on government 
support and an increased need to broaden funding bases. Many nonprofit organisations have moved 
towards a more corporate model of governance, with greater emphasis on accountability, and an 
increasing reliance on commercial financial practices (Moeller & Valentinov, 2012; Young, Jung, & 
Aranson, 2010).  
Developments in governance and management are vital to the continued success of organisations in 
the nonprofit sector. This study investigated the governance models and executive management 
practices in two case study organisations within the disability sector in Australia. What emerged were 
two contrasting relationships between the board and the organisation via the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO). What has appeared is an image of the relationship between the board and the organisation, 
with the CEO as a conduit, somewhat akin to the narrow section of an hourglass which regulates the 
flow of sand from one part to the other.  
CONTEMPORARY NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVES 
Bartlett and Campey (2010) are strong advocates of the view that nonprofit governance should be 
deliberately different to corporate governance. Despite this, there is an increasing move towards the 
application of commercial/corporate governance principles. Recent Australian research has identified 
 
 
that there is variation in governance models and approaches. Saj (2013) has identified that a range of 
factors influenced the mode of governance. The operation and inter-relationship of these factors 
increases the onus for good governance and management. In Australia, as elsewhere, there has been a 
widespread adoption of various forms of what is known as the Carver approach to governance. 
Developed by John Carver and his associates, the Carver model, sometimes referred to as the Policy 
Governance Model, posits that a clear separation of governance and operations is achieved by the 
board establishing a policy framework, clear delegations and precise reporting requirements. Elements 
of this approach include “dashboard style” reporting to the board using indicators of progress against 
those reporting requirements. Sometimes referred to as a “hands-off” approach,  this model seeks to 
have the board operate with one voice, and communicate with the CEO who has responsibility for 
running the organisation (Carver, 2002).  
Agency Theory (Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009) posits that a principal or owner engages an agent to 
run the organisation on their behalf. In nonprofit organisations there are multiple principals to whom 
the agent must be accountable. Agency Theory postulates that the agent will operate in the best 
interest of the principal only when it is in their self-interest to do so. Importantly, principals seek to 
counter potentially divergent interests by monitoring the activities of the agent(s) and by alignment of 
incentives (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997).  
Brown (2005, p. 333) found that Agency Theory should not only ensure ethical and financially sound 
outcomes, but should also seek “adherence to mission, values and the organisation’s social rationale”. 
He concluded that, in organisations that were perceived by board members and executives to be 
operating effectively, there was strong board recognition and understanding of historical purpose and 
operating context coupled with better strategic guidance and development of external relationships.  
The idea that governance codes developed for the private sector are applicable in the nonprofit sector 
is gaining momentum. A range of governance codes and practice guidelines have emerged (Fishel, 
2008). Some positions on nonprofit boards are often occupied by business people who are familiar 
with the ASX Principles, which are therefore likely to be incorporated into practice.  
 
 
In 2003 Standards Australia released the Australian Good Governance Principles (hereafter 
Standards Australia Principles). These were developed with reference to the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance, the IFSA Blue Book, and the ASX Listing Rules. At about the same time, law 
firm Freehills released The Role of Directors and Governance Issues for Charities (MacDougall, 
2003). The Standards Australia Principles (2003) includes an appendix covering special issues for 
nonprofit governance. These Principles have been criticised as treating nonprofit organisations as an 
afterthought (Hough, McGregor-Lowndes, & Ryan, 2004a). They remain a part of the contemporary 
‘mix’ of informing principles that Australian nonprofit boards consider in relation to their own board 
structures and practices. 
Personal responsibility and board member skills 
McGregor-Lowndes (2008) argued that board members owe a personal responsibility to the 
organisation. He suggests that  
This focus on individual responsibility can be easily overlooked by directors who otherwise 
work as a team through the board structures. However, when legal proceedings are issued, 
the name of the individual director, not the board, is on the writs. Further, Parliaments are 
making individual board members as liable as the organisation for breaches of the law done 
in the name of the nonprofit organisation, so directors are being individually sued as well as 
the organisation in legal proceedings (McGregor-Lowndes, 2008, p. 99). 
Given this element of personal responsibility, boards seek tools to assist them in their roles, and in 
many cases must rely on the advice of their CEO in their adoption. Often board members are 
volunteers from outside the sector and can lack understanding of the issues which drive the 
organisation. This can result in the CEO leading strategy decisions, policy development, and planning 
(Stone & Ostrower, 2007), an approach not in keeping with the higher expectations of personal 
responsibility from board members.  
Board monitoring of staff, including the CEO, requires knowledge of both the relevant sector and of 
governance. Collectively, a board should have the requisite combination of knowledge and experience 
 
 
to govern effectively (Brown 2005). Board members, however, often place all their trust in CEOs 
(Miller, 2002), and leadership of the organisation is the province of the CEO rather than the board 
(curiously referred to as board-centred leadership by Herman and Heimovics, 1991, 1994 cited in 
Reid & Turbide, 2012). Reid and Turbide (2012, p. 82) argue that while traditionally Agency Theory 
suggests that “ultimately responsibility for an organisation rests with its board”, risk assessment by 
the board may not be easy, and a lot of trust must be placed in the CEO. The reality is significant 
reliance on the CEO, especially where board members are voluntary, busy, and not skilled in either 
the sector or governance. Chairs and members of nonprofit boards need to be cognisant of this 
concern about overreliance on the CEO.  
Governance in Practice 
Reid and Turbide (2012), suggest that there are two types of nonprofit governance:  trust and 
collaboration, or distrust and control. Central to this is the relationship between the board and the 
organisation with the CEO at the centre of this. The Carver Policy Governance Model (Carver, 2010) 
widely influential, but less widely researched (Hough, McGregor-Lowndes, & Ryan, 2004b), is said 
to increase the involvement of board directors (Smith & Edmond, 2009). This model suggests the 
establishment of policies in four areas:  outcomes being sought, executive delegations, board/CEO 
relationship and governance processes. While this model is in wide use, it has been argued that there 
may be significant shortcomings in its application, particularly in terms of the board being alerted 
early to “situational complexities” (Williams, 2010, p. 302).  
RESEARCH APPROACH  
This study was part of a larger project to examine the adoption of more commercial approaches to 
governance by nonprofit organisations. A case study approach was adopted to examine governance 
practices in two larger organisations in the disability sector in Australia. A total of fifteen semi-
structured interviews were conducted: seven in one organisation, and eight in the other. A purposive 
sampling approach was employed and semi-structured interviews were conducted with the CEO, 
board chair, board members, and with senior staff representatives from both organisations. Following 
the interviews, a thematic coding approach was taken by the research team and key issues identified. 
 
 
An emergent approach to thematic analysis led to the identification of a range of recurring themes and 
issues including commercialisation of the sector and changing organisational relationships. One key 
theme which emerged was the nature of the relationship between the board and the Chief Executive 
Officer, in particular with respect to communication between the board and the operational 
components of the organisation. The research question which emerged in relation to this theme was 
identified as: What is the nature of CEO control over board-staff communication?  A comparative 
approach was taken when examining this question in the two case study organisations.  
Selected Case Study Organisations 
Both case study organisations, hereafter referred to as Case L and Case B, are independent Australian 
organisations in the disability services sector, supporting clients/members, their families, and carers. 
Both organisations see themselves as having an advocacy and public education role on behalf of their 
constituencies. Fundraising, other income generating programs and government grants fund services 
and contribute towards relevant research.  
The annual turnover of one organisation (Case L) has become much larger than the other (Case B) 
with a move into a more commercial mode, and the appointment of high profile experienced 
commercial experts to the board and as donors. Both organisations offer a range of services to 
members and clients. Case B is more reliant on government monies to fund services and operations. 
The services offered by the two organisations are different due to the very nature of the disabilities 
which led to their foundation. One has as its main focus people living with a degenerative disease 
which tends to come on in adulthood (Case L), while the other has as its focus disabilities usually 
diagnosed in childhood (Case B). Case L, where the main focus is on slowing the rate of progression 
of disease, offers services ranging from information to physiotherapy, occupational therapy and 
accommodation. Community awareness and fundraising are key roles of this organisation. The Case B 
focal point is support for the individual and their families, offering services ranging from transport 
and accommodation to leisure and employment, in a whole-of-life approach. Community awareness 




Both boards include appointed and elected members. In Case L the board has a range of high profile 
people from legal and financial backgrounds as well as elected members. The board in Case B has 
recently been restructured and selection criteria introduced in the appointment of new board members, 
targeting people with experience and expertise. Elected members constitute just over half of the 
membership of the board in Case L. In Case B the board has mainly appointed members with some 
elected members. Both boards have a mix of male and female members, coming from a range of 
professional and personal backgrounds. Both have subcommittees for governance issues including 
risk management and services. One of the organisations has a stated adoption of the Carver Model, 
while the other makes no particular statement.  
The Chief Executive Officers  
In both organisations the role of the CEO is a lynchpin in the organisational operation. Both CEOs 
had financial institutional backgrounds, although one came directly into the CEO position via an 
appointment process and the other had served time on the board before being selected as CEO. Case L 
has had the same CEO for a number of years, while Case B had only recently appointed their CEO. 
Performance management of the CEO in both organisations was clearly a priority for the board.  
THE BOARD AND THE CEO 
A key contrast which emerged was the relationship between the Board and the organisation via the 
CEO. Both boards have been strongly influenced in their governance approach by corporate board 
models due in part to their respective CEOs experience, and a product of the appointed (business) 
members.  
Board composition has an important role in determining the approach adopted by the board (Ford, 
Gresock, & Peeper, 2011). Both organisations had adopted a form of the Carver Model, with Case B 
working towards this as an explicitly desired form, and Case L having already moved into a variation 
of this approach. Both boards have moved towards a more commercial approach to governance, 
reflecting the experience of the CEO.  
 
 
The personal management styles of the CEOs were distinctly different. In Case L there was a clear 
hourglass-shaped relationship between the board and the staff, with the contact between staff 
members and board members being infrequent and social (such as at Christmas functions), and along 
established lines such as reports passed through the CEO. There is a tight hold by the CEO on 
communication channels between the board and the senior staff.  
The board and I, have a clean and clear understanding that to retain governance structure in 
those robust processes there, there has to be understanding in place about how we do these 
things. Once the waters get muddied, you actually, you bring an element of risk into the 
business, which we haven’t had 
This did not appear to be questioned by anyone interviewed.  
The management’s job is to run the business..., to implement strategy and report to the board 
with transparent practices with regularity. The board’s role is to hire and fire the CEO, define 
strategy and monitor the business. 
The Board does not get involved with the day to day running of the organisation. Everything we 
do is either funnelled to the board from the CEO or down to management through the CEO. 
The CEO is a conduit for the board and senior management. 
In contrast, this strict hourglass-shaped approach was deliberately avoided in Case B, having been 
considered to be a cause of the organisational crisis some years earlier leading to the replacement of 
the CEO. A more open accessible relationship between staff members and board members was being 
encouraged, with one interviewee observing: 
The biggest change has been the perceived openness and honesty exhibited by the new CEO.  
In Case B, board members are encouraged to contact any of the senior staff, and there is regular 
scheduled contact between the board and the other parts of the organisation including board meetings 
in regional locations. Board members interviewed indicated that they would as a courtesy advise the 
CEO if they were to contact staff. Senior staff did not express any concerns about being contacted 
directly by board members. The CEO indicated that there was some way to go towards having this 
open contact culture fully adopted:  
I believe there should be a sense that anybody can phone anybody …., I have no fear about my 
role and by position. .... You know it’s not ego driven, it’s all about the organisation and the 
performance and the outcomes.  
This was a clear point of significant difference between the two organisations.  
 
 
The board in Case B was very clear about its role around setting strategy, reviews of performance, 
review of the finances, debating the quality of service delivery, and long-term objectives.  
The board has a legitimate role in setting the scene, in part to reflect the broader community 
and stakeholders’ expectations. It's the executive management's responsibility to deliver 
against those expectations. However, over the past couple of years the board has become more 
involved in the day-to-day running of the organisations because of the financial crisis.  
Due to the recent period of significant change, this board is involved in working more closely with 
management than would normally be preferred. The board in Case L, too, is clear about its role in 
setting strategic direction, but takes a more hands off approach, in part because of the longevity of the 
tenure of the CEO and board members.  
CEO Performance Expectations 
Both entities have a strong focus on their overall organisational performance. The organisations 
embrace non-financial (qualitative) performance reporting through staff and client surveys. In Case L 
members are surveyed annually and staff surveys are conducted biennially. The two boards have CEO 
performance review systems. In Case B, the CEO had been employed to bring the organisation back 
on track after a crisis, after holding board membership. Having come out of a serious crisis, Case B 
had implemented a performance review process at every meeting. Interviewees expressed the view 
that the board was currently supporting the CEO to help the organisation make its way back to 
ongoing sustainability; a work in progress. One board member expressed the view that we are moving 
sensibly and smoothly along but a more strategic approach was still another year away.   
In Case L, the board expected to have operational matters dealt with by the CEO and preferred to 
receive the classic Carver Model ‘dashboard style’ reports as an integral part of the monitoring 
process. Performance indicators were seen to be clear, simple and focused. Opportunities for the 
board to know about daily operations were limited by the reporting structure. Case L seemed to be 
very much in the hands of the CEO. CEO individual performance did not appear to be separated from 
the regular reporting by the CEO on organisational performance. Annual reviews of salary were tied 
into a performance review of the individual but were also based on the success of the organisation 




THE HOURGLASS-SHAPED RELATIONSHIP 
History has played an important role in the governance of both case study organisations. The stable, 
long term appointment of the CEO in Case L has meant that a more hands off style of governance has 
evolved to the point of an hourglass-shaped point of contact between the board and senior 
management. In effect the CEO is the only conduit between the organisation and the board (Figure 1).  
Figure 1:  Hourglass-shaped board-staff communications 
 
The more recent appointment of the CEO in Case B following an organisational crisis meant that the 
board was still intimately involved in operations. The focus was on recovery leading to future 
sustainability, but there was a strong emphasis on open communication between board members and 







Figure 2:  Accessible board-staff communication 
 
The organisational cultures evident in both organisations were clearly influenced by shifts in the 
history of the organisation and the approach adopted by the respective CEOs. In Case L, the long term 
appointment of the CEO had a pervasive effect across the organisation and its culture, with a strong 
managerial style, and an evident preference for strictly controlled hourglass-shaped relationships. In 
Case B, the more recent appointment of the CEO, following an organisational crisis, meant that a 
more open communication protocol between the board and senior staff was being promoted, and a 
trust/distrust relationship was in operation between the CEO and the board.  
The hourglass-shaped approach to the board/CEO/senior staff relationships had been applied 
successfully in Case L, in particular in the financial area where the organisation’s income had grown 
by 500% in eight years. In Case B, this form of management approach had been applied under the 








The long term appointment of the CEO, and the focussed approach in the hourglass-shaped 
relationship in Case L, at the time of this study was currently providing growth, wealth and status 
opportunities. The expansion of the funding base and a wide portfolio of fundraising options had 
created a healthy and prosperous position. The hourglass-shaped board staff relationship was based on 
structured accountability practices and a high degree of trust coupled with scrutiny from the board 
based on an internally accepted set of parameters.  
The shorter term post crisis relationship in Case B was returning the organisation to a greater level of 
sustainability and, potentially, growth. A re-organisation was taking place to reduce reliance on 
government support, and increase the range of funding options. The recent crisis had resulted in a 
level of wariness amongst some board members, and the board being more involved in the ongoing 
relationship with senior staff to increase trust and accountability. 
The examination of these case study organisations against the backdrop of the literature suggests that 
the trust/distrust paradox identified by Reid and Turbide (2012) is a healthy approach to governance. 
Key elements of the ‘hands off’ model may move the organisation too far from effective scrutiny of 
the actions of the CEO, and particularly in situations of declining performance, incompetence or less 
than ethical behaviour. The ‘dashboard style’ of reporting may be a little too distant if there is no 
effective communication between board and senior staff other than via the CEO. The expertise of the 
CEO and the different backgrounds of the board members will influence how the relationship evolves 
and operates, and on the level of trust placed in the CEO. Herman and Heimovics (cited in Reid & 
Turbide, 2012) observed that leadership is the province of the CEO rather than the board, which is 
evident in both organisations. Table 1 lays out a series of risks and benefits for organisations and 




Table 1:  Benefits and Risks of different models of  







Communication between board and 
staff is strictly via CEO. All 
communication is vetted by CEO. 
Does not preclude staff attending 
board meetings to present reports and 
updates. Communication control 
rests with CEO.  
Accessible board-staff 
communication 
Communication is permitted 
between board members and senior 
staff. Protocols in place to provide 
guidance. Board members are 
encouraged to visit sites and interact 
with staff and clients. Accessibility 
is key to communication.  
BENEFITS • Clear line of communication 
between staff and board. 
• CEO ensures that board decisions 
are implemented. 
• One version of all 
communications. 
• Knowledge vested in CEO and 
shared with board and staff. 
• Multiple lines of communication 
between staff and board. 
• Checks against individual 
versions of communications 
limit opportunities for filtering.  
• Open opportunity for staff to 
alert board members of 
concerns. 
• Dispersed knowledge of 
operations and strategy.  
RISKS • All communication between 
board and staff is confined to 
one person. 
• CEO has opportunity to filter 
communication. 
• Staff must take concerns to 
CEO. 
• Knowledge vested in CEO.  
• Potential for multiple versions 
of communications. 
• Potential for ambiguous 
communication and 
implementation of board 
decisions. 
• Blurred lines of communication 
between staff and board. 
• Dispersed knowledge of 
operations and strategy. 
 
The key to a significant portion of the research about the relationship between the board and 
management is the notion of trust. What Phillips, Freeman, and Wicks (2003, p. 484) label 
“Managerial opportunism” is a potential problem in any trust based model of governance. Effective 
directors of nonprofit organisations recognise the need to recruit other equally skilled and effective 
board members. A strong supportive relationship between the board and the executive involves 
getting board members directly pursuing the mission of the organisation (Balser & McClusky, 2005). 
There is a need to incorporate a wide range of stakeholders so that the board has the appropriate 
knowledge and expertise (Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009). This then enables the board to ensure that 
 
 
whichever model of communication is adopted, the benefits can be attained by structured informed 
scrutiny of the organisation.  
IMPLICATIONS FOR BOARDS AND CEOS 
Ultimately, as a result of this study there are several key propositions for consideration by nonprofit 
organisations. The move towards commercialisation is inevitable and organisations which do not 
broaden their portfolios will not be sustainable. Moving away from traditional funding bases requires 
a greater level of scrutiny and accountability. Boards must be able to both trust their CEOs and rely on 
them to manage effectively, while at the same time maintaining a certain level of distrust to fulfil the 
oversight role which is a prime responsibility. An integral part of this relationship is the establishment 
of clear arrangements for communication between the board members and senior staff, including the 
CEO.  
The evidence from this study is that the board should determine what works with reference to 
particular contextual variables. This should not be driven by the CEO alone. The board has a 
responsibility to establish the nature of the relationship and to establish the manner of the agency 
placed on the CEO. A governance model which involves both trust and distrust, a form of stewardship 
can form the basis of a sound relationship, thus allowing the board to carry out its duties effectively. 
Crucial to the manner of agency placed on the CEO is the need to ensure that the checks and balances 
in place are robust, engender trust, and are able to be effective, regardless of the individuals who 
occupy roles on the board or in senior management. Significantly, this agency needs to be able to 
operate to suit the mission and values of the organisation, and the context in which it is operating. 
This is a fine balancing act, and requires skill on the part of the board and senior management 
including the CEO.  
The Carver Model includes as one of its tenets the need to have a clear delineation of the Board –CEO 
relationship. The board is required to clarify delegations to the CEO, and to set the parameters for 
delegations and accountability. While “management plays a critical role in establishing the 
governance of an organisation” (Smith & Edmond, 2009, 60) it is imperative that the board take 
responsibility for the approach in place. The model adopted is likely to be less important than the 
 
 
skilled rigorous adoption of a model which includes the appropriate balance between trust and 
distrust, allows a suitable level of communication between governance and operational areas of the 
organisation, and meets the needs of the organisation. The relationship between the CEO and the 
board is crucial in the effective governance and management of the organisation. Board behaviour and 
culture need to be pre-eminent in whatever approach is adopted, and will play a role in determining 
outcomes for the organisation.  
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
This study was undertaken to investigate key developments in governance practices in the nonprofit 
sector in Australia. The findings suggest that there have been significant changes in nonprofit 
organisations in their pursuit to become self-sufficient. The governance practices differ in these two 
case study organisations because of their history and leadership styles. These cases also demonstrate 
that the adoption of commercial practices has accelerated the need for better management and 
governance practices. The study highlights the importance of the partnership between the board and 
the CEO. Traditional boards of nonprofit organisations were dominated by members who were not 
commercially oriented. The move towards commercial practices required that the role of the board 
change to be more active in organisational and management issues.  
This study is limited to two organisations in the disability sector in Australia. Further analysis is 
required to establish the influence of the personal style of the CEOs in each organisation, and it will 
be necessary to further scrutinise the extent of localisation. A cross sectional examination of 
organisations in the nonprofit sector would enable a broader generalisation. This study was 
undertaken in the disability sector; it would be necessary to scan other areas such as, education, social 
welfare or sport. Accordingly, the outcomes of this research can only be used to reveal for boards and 
CEOs how others in their sector are faring. It is clear that the findings here are consistent with what 
others have argued, and this paper adds to the growing body of knowledge on how board governance 
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